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Abstract 
Recent years have seen revived interest in the role of monopsony power in wage-
setting  in  the  public  sector.  Most  evidence  focuses  on  individual  occupations 
rather  than  considering  the  implications  for  wage  and  employment  structure 
where  the  state  has  differential  monopsony  power  across  different  types  of 
workers. A model of monopsony with heterogeneous workers is constructed here. 
A large scale „natural experiment‟ of the consequences of declining monopsony 
power is the process of economic transition from communist regimes to market-
based  economies.  The  paper  shows  that  many  salient  features  of  economic 
transition, such as increasing wage inequality, rising returns to education, rising 
public  sector  pay  „markups‟  and  changing  employment  composition,  are 
compatible with this „story‟. 
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MONOPSONY WITH HETEROGENEOUS LABOUR:  
EVIDENCE FROM ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
1.  Introduction 
An important feature of the public sector is its potential market power in the labour 
market, arising from its role as the dominant employer in selected occupations, such as in 
education, provision of health care, law and order, and certain administrative functions. This 
power  gives  public  sector  enterprises  the  scope  for  monopsonistic  wage-setting  in  these 
labour markets. Of course, in some settings, the public sector faces the countervailing power 
of well-organised public sector trade unions and in such a situation, alternative models of 
pay-setting are required.
1 
The analysis of the implications of „pure‟ monopsony for wage-setting has therefore 
tended to focus on settings where, a priori, workers have little countervailing power – the 
classic examples being teachers or coal-miners in a geographically isolated setting facing a 
single employer (Landon and Baird, 1971; Luizer and Thornton, 1986; Boal, 1997; Boal and 
Ransom,  1997;  Merrifield,  1999).  The  early  literature  on  this  subject  did  however  find 
evidence of collusive behaviour among public sector enterprises even in large metropolitan 
areas, such as in the employment of nurses (Fogel and Lewin, 1974, Sullivan, 1989).
2 The 
recent  resurgence  of  interest  in  monopsonistic  wage -setting  has  followed  from  the 
recognition that search models with imperfect information give employers some degree of 
market power in wage -setting in many labour market settings   and Manning (2003) has 
explored the implications of this for a variety of standard labour market application s.
3  This 
renewed interest has in turn has led to a number of recent empirical applications which are 
strongly suggestive of monopsonistic or oligopsonistic wage-setting behaviour by employers, 
especially in the public sector (Journal of Labor Economics, 2010).   
                                                           
1 There is with a well-established literature on the implications of coordinated and uncoordinated 
bargaining for economic outcomes stemming from the work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988). 
22 The reluctance of NHS hospital trusts to move away from national p ay scale rates despite being 
given the freedom to do so after the introduction of Foundation Trust status in England in 2002, and 
the failure to use recruitment premia on a widespread scale despite local shortage of certain skilled 
health professionals, are also prima facie evidence of cartel behaviour. See the discussion of NHS 
Employers‟ evidence to the NHS Pay Review Body in NHSPRB (2009). 
3 Although somewhat surprisingly, not in the specific field of public sector labour markets, an 
unfortuante admission admitted to us in correspondence by the author. 2 
 
A neglected issue in this literature, however, is the effect of monopsonistic wage-
setting behaviour in the public sector on employment structure and on wage differentials.  
Much of the empirical literature on monopsony has focused on individual occupations such 
as teaching and health care professionals. The nature of the markets for these occupations 
implies that the public sector is the dominant employer and that the elasticity of labour supply 
of workers to these occupations or employment sectors is not highly (or infinitely) elastic.  
Workers with these qualifications can work elsewhere in the economy in other occupations 
but are unlikely to fully recompense their costs of training for their specific skills.  However 
the public sector also employs workers (e.g. in unskilled ancillary occupations, in general 
administrative functions, or in specific professions such as accountancy) where the public 
sector  is  not  the  dominant  employer  or  where  individuals  have  skills  which  are  easily 
transferable and where the elasticity of labour supply to the public sector is therefore much 
greater.   
To the extent that the public sector employer can drive a wedge between the marginal 
product and the wage only where the elasticity of labour supply is relatively low, then a 
public  sector  employing  a  mix  of  workers  with  different  elasticities  of  supply  to  the 
occupation or employer is likely to generate a wage distribution and an employment structure 
that is different from that in a competitive labour market.  It is this contention that will be 
explored in the present paper by establishing a simple theoretical model and then applying it 
to  a  large  scale  „natural  experiment‟:  the  process  of  economic  transition  in  Eastern  and 
Central  Europe  from  economies  dominated  by  largely  public  sector  wage-setting  to 
economies characterised by market-based incentives. 
We shall show that many of the „stylised facts‟ of labour markets during economic 
transition, such as growing wage dispersion, increasing returns to education, increasing (not 
falling) public sector wage premia, changing employment composition and the like, can be 
explained by the weakening monopsonistic power of the public sector in segments of the 
labour  market  over  time.  The  power  of  the  dominant  public  sector  in  a  pre-transition 
economy is therefore reflected in the differential extraction of economic rent from workers; a 
process that is increasingly limited as the process of transition occurs.
4 
                                                           
4 It  is  of  course  something  of  an  irony  that  the  labour  theory  of  value,  underpinning  Marxist 
economics, predicates capialist accumulation on the extraction of surplus value from workers (for a 
discussion of such theories, see Meek, 1956)  whereas our interpretation of the process of transition 3 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a 
model of a public sector enterprise in which output (employment) is maximised subject to a 
hard budget constraint, employing heterogeneous workers with different elasticities of labour 
supply.  Although the model has general implications, we also show how the process of 
economic  transition  from  centrally-planned  to  market  economies  can  be  interpreted  as  a 
weakening  of  the  monopsony  power  of  the  public  enterprise,  with  implications  for 
employment  and  wage  structure.  Section  3  calibrates  the  model  on  some  reasonable 
parameter  values  (for  the  transition  in  Hungary).  The  calibration  model  is  reinforced  by 
descriptive labour market data for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) economies in Section 4 
which confirm the „stylised facts‟ referred to in the previous discussion.  The final section 
then  summarises  the  findings  and  considers  why  such  a  model  provides  a  superior 
explanation of employment and wage trends than other models‟; these other models being 
skill-biased technical change (SBTC), solidaristic, and bureaucratic models of wage -setting. 
2.  A model of monopsony with heterogeneous workers 
This section derives a monopsony model with heterogeneous workers.  As the model 
description progresses, we provide some descriptive evidence of its realism in the context of 
CEE countries. 
We assume that the objective function of the public sector enterprise is to hire labour 
until its available budget is exhausted; this is equivalent to maximising total output where 
profit (or surplus) is zero.  The enterprise therefore faces a hard budget constraint  given 
exogenously by the level of total revenues disbursed to the enterprise from overall public 
revenues.   For simplicity, we abstract  from other factors of production; thus,  the budget 
constraint is defined as the total wage bill  .
5  This inverse relation between employment 
and wage rate, representing the effective labour demand function in the public sector, is also 
used by Leslie (1985) to describe the union  wage-employment combination given by the 
wage bill fixed by the available public budget (i.e.  a so-called „cash limit‟).  In our model, 
however, the public sector enterprise is an output maximiser that faces two constraints: first 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
from self-styled „communist‟ to „market capitalist‟ regimes requires the elimination of a process of 
selective rent extraction from specific groups of workers.  
5 Public sector enterprises are in any event typically highly labour intensive in most economic 
systems, with wage costs typically accounting for 60-75% of budgetary costs in typical public sectors 
such as education, health care and law and order. 
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the budget constraint and second the supply curve for each type of labour.  Moreover, we 
assume that workers have no bargaining power (no right to strike etc.). 
These assumptions need little justification in centrally planned CCE economies, in 
which wages were set centrally and were not directly linked to enterprise performance. Köllő 
(1998)  explains  that,  in  the  short  run,  firms  under  central  planning  had  an  incentive  to 
continuously  bargain  for  cash  budgets  to  increase  employment  that  was  compatible  with 
revenues, instead of profit maximisation. Furthermore, the pay equalising mechanism was 
based upon managers‟ incentives to increase employment coupled with political constraints 
and prohibitive taxes on wage increases. Consequently, the likelihood that some firms would 
set  wages  high  above  the  industry  average  or  lag  behind  substantially  was  rather  low.
6  
Moreover, faced with administrative wage-setting, quit rates were severely circumscribed by 
housing shortages. Labour unions in centrally planned economies had no bargaining role and 
according  to  Flanagan  (1995),  their  main  function  was  to  challenge  dismissals.  The 
consequence was increased employment and falling real wages during the pre -transition 
period,  albeit  wages were  augmented  by  non-wage benefits such as hou sing, child care, 
transport and meal allowances (Nunberg, 1999). Estrin (1994) argues that these social welfare 
benefits in Czechoslovakia added around 5 percent of the total wage bill.  
Continuing the description of our model: assume that the public enterprise can choose 
any combination of wages, w, and employment, E, of different types of workers to satisfy this 
budget constraint. There is no presumption that, as a result of the decisions of public sector 
enterprises, the whole labour force is thereby employed.
7  The model developed here solves 
                                                           
6   The pre-reform „self-management‟ model in Yugoslavia is sometimes seen as an exceptional case, 
with greater discretion in wage-setting at the enterprise level (Krstić and Reilly, 2003). Nevertheless, 
even here, individual wage-setting within the firm was strictly limited because, in order to even out 
differences in pay among firms, the government fixed the firm's wage bill at a rate which was termed 
a "socially warranted" wage bill (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003) and the standard communist 
mechanism of enterprise bargaining with central government to maximise cash limits in order to 
increase employment remained. Vodopivec (1993) provides details of how the “socially warranted” 
personal earnings fund of the firm derived from an index of the firm‟s relative „business success‟. 
This index was computed by comparing the firm‟s actual income with a prescribed norm assessed by 
a special body representing the Republic‟s government and other political and economic agents. This 
index was then converted into the “correction factor”. The main purpose of the correction factor was 
to dampen the index of business success for the above-average firms and to raise the index for the 
below-average firms.  The essence of the policy, embodied in the socially warranted personal earnings 
fund, was to level earnings across firms of comparable size and occupational structure.  
7  This rigid system created over-employment which is usually termed „hidden‟ unemployment since 
open unemployment was not permitted. In pre-transition economies, the public sector was officially 
the only existing sector of employment, with measured public sector employment varying from 70% 
of the workforce in Poland to 99% of the workforce in Czechoslovakia in 1988 (Milanović, 1998). 5 
 
optimal levels of wages and employment for a public sector enterprise with two types of 
workers, skilled and unskilled. In subscripts, the notation s denotes skilled and u denotes 
unskilled. 
Each worker of a particular type has a constant marginal revenue product  . The 
labour supply curve E(w) for each type of worker is a function of the wage rate,  . In the 
setting  of  public  sector  monopsony,  this  wage  rate  can  be  set  below  marginal  revenue 
product,  ,  depending  on  the  labour  supply  elasticity,  .  Hence,  when   is  some 
constant number (i.e.  ), the public sector has some monopsony power such that: 
.                    (1) 
A key assumption in the following analysis is that s<u. 
The enterprise‟s objective function is to maximise employment and therefore output 
as a function of two worker types, such as to exhaust the exogenous budget constraint, i.e.: 
                   (2) 
s.t.  = ws(E)Es +wu(E)Eu    
note that, in the monopsony case, the wage depends on the level of employment, unlike the 
case of a competitive labour market.  
Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale of the 
following form: 
,                   (3)  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
However, such large fractions should be treated with caution, not just because areas of private sector 
activity  often  took  part  in  a  informal  setting,  but  also  because  public  sector  enterprises  were 
sometimes characterised by absentee and notional employees which boosted the notional employment 
figures. The alternative occupation, or „reservation price‟ of workers in such economies, could be 
characterised as agricultural employment, small-scale enterprises, and informal activity. However the 
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where  is the elasticity of output with respect to skilled labour when unskilled labour is held 
constant:
8  and   is the elasticity of output with respect to unskilled labour 
when skilled labour is held constant:  . 
The competitive solution 
As  a  benchmark,  consider  first  the  competitive  outcome  where  the  wage  of  each 
worker type is independent of the level of employment.  Hence, the wage of each worker type 
is exogenously given and equal to its marginal revenue product:  
,                   (4) 
If  the  marginal  revenue  product  of  skilled  workers  relative  to  unskilled  workers  in  the 
competitive case is denoted by  , we can express the wage differential of skilled to 
unskilled workers in the competitive case as: 
                       (5) 
The first-order conditions of the optimisation problem given by (2) with respect to   and 
are:        
                          (6a) 
                         (6b) 
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8 is also the share s  of skilled workers in the total cost: 
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We can also express the employment levels of skilled and unskilled labour as: 
and  
and obtain the relative employment of skilled to unskilled labour,  : 
                          (8) 
Finally, after standard transformations we also get expressions for the steady state 
level of employment for skilled and unskilled labour:  
 and                         (9a) 
                           (9b) 
The monopsony solution 
We assume that, for  each worker type,  the  labour supply  elasticity,  , is  some 
constant positive number (i.e.  ), and differs across skills. Monopsony power allows 
the employer to drive a wedge between the wage and the marginal product of the worker; that 
wedge being greater the lower the supply elasticity. Hence public sector monopsony can 
reduce the wage of each worker type below its marginal revenue product, and the public 
sector enterprise can thereby hire more workers, given the fixed total wage bill and zero 
profit condition, than in a competitive labour market.  
Consider  the  skilled  worker  type,  with  labour  supply  elasticity: 
.  Combining this expression with (1), we get the wage of a skilled 
workers which can be expressed as:  
 where                       (10) 
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The inverse of monopsony power can be expressed by the parameters:  and 
. These parameters (  and  ) indicate the extent to which wage setting departs 
from the marginal product rule as showed by (10). When   the competitive setting 
holds,  when   the  monopsony  setting  holds.  Because   it  follows  that 
 and  hence:  .  Again,  we  can  write  a  similar  expression  for 
unskilled workers, noting however that the  greater supply  elasticity of  unskilled workers 
reduces the „wedge‟ between the marginal product and the wage for this group.  The wage 
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where   and denote  the  levels  of  employment  of  skilled  and  unskilled  labour, 
respectively, under monopsony. 
The employment levels of skilled and unskilled labour, under monopsony, are then 
given by: 
 and   
The final expression is the steady state conditional demands for skilled and unskilled 
labour under monopsony which can be deduced after standard transformations to be: 
 and                      (12a) 
                       (12b) 
Comparing these results with the competitive solution, then, keeping   constant, the 
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relative labour supply elasticity of skilled workers to unskilled workers,  . At the same 
time, the wage gap   between skilled and unskilled labour will be lower (i.e. there will be 
greater  wage  compression),  the  lower  the  relative  labour  supply  elasticity  of  skilled  to 
unskilled workers. These are the key results that underpin or empirical investigation of wage 
and employment differentials before and after economic transition.  
Transition 
Consider the process of „economic transition‟ as a decline in the degree of monopsony 
power of the public sector as the private sector increases its share of employment, whether 
through privatisations and contracting-out of public functions, or from the establishment of 
new private enterprises.  As the labour market moves towards a competitive outcome, relative 
wages  and  relative  employment  of  skilled  workers  change.  This  change  arises  from  two 
factors: (i) the declining ability of enterprises to exploit monopsony power in order to drive a 
wedge between the marginal product and the wage and (ii) increased opportunities for those 
workers who are most „exploited‟ (here, skilled workers) to shift between enterprises, hence 
increasing their labour supply elasticity to the individual enterprise. This implies an increase 
in the relative labour supply elasticity of skilled workers i.e.  . 
During transition, the changes in relative employment of skilled workers,  , keeping 
the relative marginal revenue product of skilled workers,  , constant, depends on the changes 
of two parameters:  . Comparative statics shows that: 
and   
 
 
Similarly, the relative wage of skilled workers can be expressed as a function of the relative 



































   









   

s ) 1 ( 
m e10 
 
                   (13) 
Thus,  changes  in  the  relative  wage  of  skilled  workers  depend  on  the  changes  of  two 
parameters:  . Comparative statics shows that: 
and   
 
 
Finally, we now consider the overall differential between monopsony and competitive 
relative wages and employments of skilled workers.  Write:  
 and                         (14) 
A strong result now follows given the assumption that the supply elasticity of skilled 
labour was originally lower than the supply elasticity of unskilled labour. Equation (14) and 
the preceding analysis confirm that the relative wage of skilled workers obtained under a 
monopsony  solution  is  lower  than  under  a  competitive  solution  i.e. ,  and  that  the 
relative  employment  of  skilled  workers  under  monopsony  solution  is  greater  than  under 
competitive solution, i.e.  . So a decline in the relative public sector monopsony power 
over skilled workers may be expressed as    implying a decline in the employment 
share of skilled workers (even in the public sector):   towards the competitive share  , and 
an increase in the wage differential of skilled to unskilled workers (even in the public sector): 
 towards competitive,  . 
Evidence from other sources suggets that the structure of wage setting inherited from 
central  planning  strongly  influenced  the  pay  determination  process  at  the  start  of  the 
economic  transition.  Compared  with  other  aspects  of  economic  policy,  relatively  little 
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and money supply remained particularly strong. Lane (1992) surveys various wage policies 
that  were  utilised  at  the  beginning  of  the  economic  transition  such  as:  a  specific  wage 
constraint, a ceiling on the enterprise wage bill, a ceiling on the average wage, a wage bill 
ceiling with adjustment for output, a wage bill ceiling with adjustment for value added and 
adjustments for profits. These wage controls entailed rigidity in wages in state enterprises but 
most research studies stress their necessity in the absence of strong profit incentives and the 
fact that these enterprises were encouraged to emphasise employment over productivity (for 
example,  Corricelli  and  Revenga,  1992  and  Allison  and  Ringold,  1996).
9   Lane (1992) 
explains that the main rational for these controls was  a weakness in the governance of state 
enterprises  pending  privatisation.    Ultimately,  however,  as  transition  accelerated  and 
privatisation took place on a larger scale, such relaxation on enterprise wage differentials 
took place. 
3.  A calibration model 
This section illustrates the implications of the theoretical framework with a simple 
calibration model.  The model simulates the impact of the decline in public sector monopsony 
power on the relative employment and wages of skilled workers. It uses empirical estimates 
of labour supply elasticities for different types of workers, benchmarked on Hungarian data 
on wage and employment differentials pre- and post-transition, to assess the validity of the 
model.  It models the decline in monopsony power as a rise in the supply elasticity of skilled 
workers to the public sector as the private sector grows in importance during transition. 
4.1  Estimates of supply elasticities 
Surveys  of  the  literature  on  labour  supply  elasticities,  such  as  Boal  and  Ransom 
(1997) and Bashkar, Manning and To (2002), reveal a degree of variation in the estimates, 
not least because the literature considers different approaches to measuring the market power 
of the employer, different time horizons (short and long run) as well as different types of 
workers.  
                                                           
9   Flanagan (1995) discusses the negative consequences of tax-based incomes policies which were 
adopted  in  Eastern  Europe  during  the  early  stages  of  transition.  He  explains  that  policies  which 
targeted the average wage penalised companies that downsized to shed their least efficient workers or 
those that expanded to hire highly skilled workers, which further compressesed the public sector wage 
structure. For that reason, he advocated policies that targeted the enterprise wage bill, allowing for 
downsizing that could be accompanied by an increase in average wage to attract and retain skilled 
workers.  12 
 
One group of studies measure supply elasticities in „dynamic‟ monopsony settings 
(Manning, 2003) by noting that the level of employment in steady state is the ratio of the 
recruitment rate to the separation rate (Bashkar, Manning and To, 2002). Hence, the elasticity 
of employment with respect to wages is the difference between the elasticity of recruits with 
respect to wages and the elasticity of separations with respect to wages. Using this approach 
on United States data, Card and Krueger (1995) calculate that the upper bound for the overall 
wage  elasticity  is  5,  implying  that  wages  are  on  average  17  percent  below  the  workers‟ 
marginal  products.  A  similar  estimate  is  obtained  by  Manning  (2003)  using  data  for  the 
United Kingdom. Van Der Berg and Ridder (1993) using data from the Netherlands, apply 
the standard Burdett and Mortensen dynamic search model and measure monopsony power 
by the ratio of job offers and job destruction rates. They find the average elasticity of labour 
supply to be around 7. This is fairly elastic but considers workers as a whole. Our model 
differentiates skilled and unskilled workers. 
More pertinent studies have focused on either skilled or unskilled workers. Sullivan 
(1989) uses panel data to estimate the employer sizewage effect for nurses, after controlling 
for other factors (individual hospital effect, measures of hospital caseload etc). The wage 
elasticity of labour supply of nurses in the short run was estimated to be 1.3 and in the long 
run 3.9. Ransom and Sims (2010) estimate the labour supply elasticity of school teachers in 
the  United  States  at  3.7,  while  Falch  (2010)  obtains  the  somewhat  lower  estimate  for 
Norwegian  school  teachers  of  1.4.  On  the  other  hand,  Staiger,  Spetz  and  Phibbs  (2010) 
estimated a much lower short run wage elasticity of labour supply of between 0 and 0.2 for 
registered nurses in US hospitals run by the Veterans Administration (VA). Their estimate is 
based on a „natural experiment‟ based on the change in relative employment at individual VA 
and  non-VA  hospitals,  after  VA  hospital  wages  departed  from  the  overall  wage-setting 
machinary. In contrast, focusing on the supply elasticity for unskilled labour, Boal (1995), 
estimates that long run inverse elasticities of West Virginia coal miners, are at most 0.03, 
0.05  or  0.09,  using  discount  rates  of  5  percent,  10  percent  or  20  percent  respectively, 
implying that the inverse elasticities are essentially zero. This means that the elasticity of the 
unskilled  labour  supply  approaches  infinity  which  is  expected  given  that  workers  with 
general skills might be regarded as more mobile.  
While  these  results  suggest  a  range  of  estimates  of  labour  supply  elasticities,  the 
following  broad  conclusions  emerge:  (1)  results  depend  on  the  methods  used  such  that 
inferences from recruitment and separation rates provide greater elasticities than individual 13 
 
case  studies  (2)  short  run  elasticities  are  smaller  then  long  run  estimates  and  (3)  skilled 
workers have a lower elasticity of labour supply than unskilled workers or the workforce as a 
whole.   
4.2  A calibration on Hungarian data 
The calibration model presented here applies elasticities which are within the bands of 
these  estimates  of  labour  supply  to  actual  data  obtained  for  Hungary  during  economic 
transition. The public sector employment shares and average wages of skilled and unskilled 
full-time male workers during the economic transition from 1994 until 2003 for Hungary are 
obtained from Hámori (2007) and presented in Table 1. The unskilled group of workers is 
created by summing up unskilled (primary school or less) and low-skilled (vocational degree) 
groups. The skilled group of workers is created from middle-skilled (high school degree) and 
high-skilled (tertiary degree) groups. Note, among the salient features of Table 1, that the 
ratio of skilled to unskilled wages is higher in the private sector than the public sector and 
that both the skill differentials increase slightly over the period.  In addition, the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled workers employed in the private sector remains unchanged but falls in the 
public sector. 
Table 1: Skill composition and wages by ownership type in Hungary, 1994 and 2003 
         Private sector  Public sector 
         1994  2003  1994  2003 
Educational composition (%)             
Unskilled (U)       21.7  15.8  15.4  11.5 
Low-skilled (L)       39.4  45.1  12.7  18.3 
U+L        61.0  60.8  28.1  29.8 
Middle-skilled (M)     25.4  26.0  28.1  21.4 
High-skilled (H)     13.6  13.2  43.8  48.7 
M+H        39.0  39.2  71.9  70.2 
Ratio: Skilled to Unskilled employment  0.64  0.64  2.56  2.35 
Monthly gross earnings for education group U  85,000  95,000  73,000  100,000 
Monthly gross earnings for education group L  94,000  109,000  78,000  102,000 
Mean monthly gross earnings Unskilled (U+L)  89,500  102,000  76,000  101,000 
Monthly gross earnings for education group M  134,000  155,000  110,000  128,000 
Monthly gross earnings for education group H  242,000  360,000  132,000  228,000 
Mean monthly gross earnings Skilled (M+H)  188,000  258,000  121,000  178,000 
Ratio: Skilled to Unskilled earnings  2.10  2.53  1.60  1.76 
Notes to Table 1: Monthly gross earnings for full-time male employees are denoted in Hungarian currency HUF 
and converted to 2003 earnings by the annual CPI. The employer-provided data from the Hungarian National 
Labour Center‟s Wage Survey. Source: Hámori (2007) 
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The ratios calculated from the actual transition data in Table 1 are presented in Table 
2 in the column titled headed „Real data‟. The relative employment   and wage ratios   in 
the public sector distinguish between two groups of workers only: unskilled and skilled. The 
relative employment of skilled workers in the public sector,  , is the ratio of skilled to 
unskilled workers in the public sector in 1994 and 2003. The relative wage of skilled workers 
in the public sector,  , is the ratio of the average wage of skilled workers to the average 
wage of unskilled workers in the public sector in 1994 and 2003. The ratio of the share of 
skilled workers in the total cost (wage bill), parameter  , to the share of unskilled workers in 
the  total  cost  (wage  bill),  parameter   is  calculated  using  the  information  on 
employment and average wages of skilled and unskilled workers in the public sector in 1994 
and 2003.  
For the purpose of assessing the compression of public sector wages at the outset of 
the transition, we consider the wages paid by the private sector in 1994 as a benchmark. 
Hence, we assume that the relative wage of skilled private sector workers in the early years of 
the economic transition is close to the relative marginal revenue product of skilled workers 
.  Hence,  knowing  the  relative  wage   and  relative  marginal  revenue  product  of  skilled 
workers   we  can  calculate  the  inverse  of  public  sector  relative  monopsony  power  over 
skilled workers in 1994 and 2003:  . Then we can calculate the relative employment of 
skilled workers under a competitive solution:  .  
Table 2: Public sector monopsony: real data and model calibration 
Public 
sector  Real data  Model I calibrated values  Model II calibrated values 










  2.56  2.35  2.52  2.26  2.51  2.26 
  0.76  0.84  0.76  0.84  0.76  0.84 
  1.95  1.97  1.91  1.91  1.91  1.91 
  1.60  1.76  1.59  1.77  1.59  1.77 
  2.10  2.10  2.10  2.10  2.10  2.10 
  4.09  4.13  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00 
Notes to Table 2: See Table 1 for „Real data‟.  Derivation of all other values are described in the text. 
The next two columns of Table 2 present the calibration models for years 1994 and 
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model and given in equation (14):   and   by fitting the estimates 
of the elasticity of labour supply for skilled and unskilled workers from the literature. We 
interpret the process of transition as a weakening of monopsony power, embodied in a rise in 
the  labour  supply  elasticity  of  skilled  workers,  constraining  the  derived  elasticities  to  be 
within the „reasonable‟ values derived from the literature described previously. 
The only parameters taken from the „real data‟ column and used in columns titled as 
„model I‟ and „model II‟ are the relative marginal revenue product of skilled workers,  , and 
the  relative  share  of  skilled  workers  in  the  total  cost  (wage  bill), .  All  other 
parameters  are  generated  by  the  model.  The  „free‟  parameters  are  the  labour  supply 
elasticities of skilled and unskilled workers,   and   chosen to calibrate the inverse of the 
relative public sector monopsony power   given in the „real data‟ column. Therefore, the 
calibration  is  carried  out  by  fitting  the  values  for  skilled  and  unskilled  labour  supply 
elasticities to the corresponding ratio values from the „real data‟ column. The estimates for 
the skilled labour supply elasticity should lie within the range described in the empirical 
literature; the elasticity for unskilled labour is „large‟ and we choose two alternative values.  
The resulting values for these parameters, chosen to maximise the fit of the model, are the 
following: for Model I,  3
1994  s   and  5
2003  s   and   in both years, 1994 and 2003; 
for Model II,   and   and   in both years, 1994 and 2003. After fitting 
 and  knowing   and   we  calculate  ,  and  using  equation 
(14):   and  . 
An  inspection  of  Table  2  shows  that  if  we  take  „transition‟  as  meaning  that  the 
elasticity of skilled labour supply   increases from 3 to 5 (both within the range of empirical 
estimates described previously) and benchmark on actual 1994 values for Hungary, we can 
predict 2003 rather well.   
4.  Empirical evidence 
This section provides some descriptive data on labour market trends during transition 
in  a  number  of  East  and  Central  European  countries.    We  argue  that  these  trends  are 
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4.1  Wage inequality 
A  basic  implication  of  our  model,  whereby  transition  implies  an  erosion  in  the 
differential monopsony power of the state across worker types, is that wage inequality should 
increase faster in transition economies than in other OECD economies. This is demonstrated 
in Table 3, where changes in wage inequality (using the log 90/10 wage differential) are 
documented for four pre-1990 OECD economies and four transition economies.  Although 
the OECD economies show differential trends (a faster growth in inequality in the UK and 
the US,  and for women than men in  3 of the  4 countries),  all the measures  of  growing 
inequality are less than those for all four transition economies for which data are provided.  
The Czech Republic and Romania provide particularly sharp evidence of rising inequality.  
Table 3: Change in wage inequality in the advanced OECD countries, 1979–1990 and in 
the CEE countries, 1988-1995: Log 90/10 wage differential 






        Males          
United States  1.23  1.36  1.38  1.40  0.17  0.077 
United Kingdom  0.88  1.04  1.10  1.16  0.28  0.121 
France  1.19  1.18  1.22  1.23  0.04  0.018 
Japan  0.95  1.02  1.01  1.04  0.09  0.041 
       Females       
United States  0.96  1.16  1.23  1.27  0.31  0.141 
United Kingdom  0.84  0.98  1.02  1.11  0.27  0.123 
France  0.96  0.93  1.00  1.02  0.06  0.027 
Japan  0.78  0.79  0.84  0.83  0.05  0.023 
CEE  1988  1989  1993  1994  1995 
Five year 
change  
      All       
Czech Republic  …  0.88  1.16  …  1.31  0.358 
Hungary  1.14  …  1.30  1.33  …  0.158 
Poland  0.96  …  1.11  …  1.22  0.186 
Romania  …  0.67  1.02  …  1.12  0.375 
Notes to Table 3: Wage inequalities for selected OECD countries by Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1995) 
and for CEE countries from Rutkowski (1996a) for 1988–1993 and  Rutkowski (1997) for 1994/1995.
a The 
difference between the  last year and the first year value expressed on a five year basis.  Source: Kertesi and 
Köllő (2000) 
A similar pattern of increasing income inequality during the first years of transition 
(i.e. the early 1990s) relative to the pre-transition period (i.e. late 1980s) can be presented by 




in  a number of transitional countries using different sources.  A similar pattern emerges to 
that in Table 3. 
Table 4: Gini coefficients for income inequality 
 Year    1987 – 1988   1989  1993   1994       1993 –1994 
Author  C   H   AM   AC   P            W             P  C   H  
Bulgaria   0.25  0.23  0.3              0.34  0.34 
Czech 
Republic  0.19  0.19  0.20  0.20           0.19  0.26 
Hungary   0.21  0.21  0.25  0.25     0.27     0.23  0.24 
Poland         0.27  0.27             0.31 
Romania   0.23  0.23         0.255     0.29  0.29 
Slovakia   0.20  0.20  0.20             0.20  0.20 
Estonia   0.23  0.30         0.39       0.39 
Latvia   0.23  0.27         0.27       0.27 
Lithuania   0.23  0.28         0.34       0.36 
Russia   0.24  0.28     0.28  0.40  0.50  0.41     0.48 
Notes to Table 4: The Ginis are identified in columns by year and by different sources, indicated by 
letters:  AC  Aghion  and  Commander  (1999),  AM  Atkinson  and  Micklewright  (1992),  C  Corricelli 
(1997),  H  Honkkila (1997),  P  Popov (1996)  and  World  Bank  (1997).  Source:  Rosser,  Rosser  and 
Ahmed (2000) 
 
Finally, Table 5 presents Gini coefficients for income inequality in public and private 
sectors in two transitional countries. Table 5 shows that the increase in income inequality was 
driven partly by the emerging private sector but also by rising wage differentials in the public 
sector.  
Table 5: Gini coefficients for income inequality by ownership type 
Country  1987  1992  1995 
Poland 
All  0.23  0.25  0.29 
Public  0.23  0.24  0.27 
Private    0.29  0.33 
Hungary 
All  0.27
a   0.30  0.32
b 
Public Men    0.27  0.32 
Private Men    0.31  0.33 
Public Women    0.26  0.28 
Private Women    0.30  0.31 
Notes to Table 5: 
a 1988 
b1994. Source: Rutkowski (1997) for Poland and Laušev (2010) for Hungary 
 
4.2  Returns to education 
Another important dimension of rising inequality lies in the behaviour over time of 
returns to further and higher education, relative to the incomes of those with high school or 
uncompleted education.  The model of differential monopsony power implies that returns to 
education in CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries should be less than those in high 
income OECD countries, but that these returns should rise during the economic transition.  18 
 
Data for selected OECD and CEE countries  are presented in Table 6. Various ratios are 
given, and these broadly confirm our „story‟: returns to education are generally higher in 
OECD countries than CEE countries at the start of the transition for most comparisons, with 
more rapdily rising ratios of highly education to less education earnings in CEE countries 
during transition.  
Table 6: Changes in educational differentials in the advanced OECD countries  
and in the CEE countries 










United States  College/ High school  1979  1.37  1987  1.52  0.11 
United 
Kingdom  College/No qualification  1980  1.53  1988  1.65  0.08 
France  Males: Nonmanual/Manual   1976  1.58  1987  1.53  -0.03 
 
Females: Nonmanual/Manual
  1976  1.38  1987  1.35  -0.01 
Japan  College/Upper high school  1979  1.26  1987  1.26  0.00 
Canada  University/High school  1980  1.4  1985  1.43  0.03 
West Germany  (14-18)/(11-13) years  1981  1.36  1983  1.42  0.10 
Sweden  University/Post Secondary  1981  1.16  1986  1.19  0.03 
Netherlands  University/Secondary  1983  1.43  1987  1.23  -0.25 
CEE              
Czech Republic  Higher education/Secondary  1988  1.29  1992  1.41  0.15 
Hungary  Higher education/Secondary  1989  1.44  1994  1.47  0.03 
 
Higher 
education/Vocat.training sch.  1989  1.56  1994  1.86  0.30 
Poland  Higher education/Vocational 
secondary  1988  1.23  1993  1.39  0.16 
Notes to Table 6: For  OECD  countries:  the  calculations  by  Davis  (1992),  except  France. Educational 
differentials for males and females nonmanual/manual workers in France by Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower 
(1995). For CEE countries: calculations for Hungary by Kertesi and Köllő (2000) and for Czech Republic and 
Poland by Rutkowski (1996a). The difference between the second year and the initial year value expressed on a 
five year basis. Source: Kertesi and Köllő (2000) 
 
Public-private wage differentials by educational attainment from a study of Poland are 
presented in the Table 7, drawn from Rutkowski (1996b). The table shows that all workers, 
regardless of educational attainment, earned a premium in the private sector early in the 
process of economic transition. But whereas the private sector rewarded high qualifications 
(tertiary education) by 30 percent higher wages, workers with lower skills earned between 3 
and 11 percent more than in the public sector. In addition, the age-earnings profile in the 
private sector was found to be significantly steeper than in the public sector and earnings 







Table 7: Earnings in the private sector relative to earnings in the public sector  
by level of  educational attainment in Poland, 1993 
Educational  All  Men  Women 
Level       
All levels  105.7  102.0  106.5 
Tertiary, university level  127.3  112.3  141.4 
Tertiary, below university  132.8  105.0  140.8 
Secondary vocational  111.1  107.3  112.3 
Secondary general  105.8  102.2  103.4 
Vocational training  103.3  103.0  105.9 
Primary  110.9  108.6  107.7 
Notes to Table 7: Public sector = 100. 
Source: Rutkowski (1996b) 
As  the  process  of  economic  transition  proceeds,  however,  public  sector  wage 
increases began to accelerate, especially among groups of workers with attractive options in 
the private sector i.e. the higher skilled.
10 This is compatible with the weakening role of 
monopsonistic power in the public sector towards high skilled workers . Table 8 shows two 
phenomena for Hungary during the transition. First, pay in the most senior roles in private 
enterprise accelerate rapidly as the market-based share of economic activity increases.  This 
should not be too surprising because „top pay‟ in the private sector (e.g. CEOs) far exceeds 
top pay in the public sector in most market-oriented economies. Second, however, pay among 
public  sector  administrative  groups  increases  more  rapidly  among  the  higher  skilled  and 
higher paid occupations within the public sector. 
Table 8: Relative salary position of certain occupations in public administration  
and in the private sector, Hungary 1986-1996 
(whole economy average of the year = 100) 














Chief executives   191  208  243  379  27  82 
Business 
administration   148  148  180  234  22  58 
Higher educated 
bureaucrats   138  147  173  221  25  50 
Lower educated 
bureaucrats   82  105  108  121  32  15 
Administrative 
occupations   78  83  89  93  14  12 
Notes to Table 8: With higher education level.  With secondary school education level. Source: Kézdi (1998) 
                                                           
10   There  are  many  case  studies  of  this  for  transition  economies:  see,  for  example,  Orazem  and 








Similar changes are confirmed by Rutkowski (1996b) for Poland. In particular, Gini 
coefficient presented in Table 9 shows that wage decompression in the public sector mainly 
occured among white-collar workers. Moreover, earnings at the bottom and at the top decile 
relative to the median show that wage inequalities among white-collar workers rose at the 
beginnig of economic transition not because wages of the low-paid workers declined but 
mainly because wages of the top-paid workers rose.  
Table 9: Changes in earnings distribution by broad occupational groups,  
Poland 1987-1993 
    1987  1993 
    Socialised  National  Public  Private 
All  Gini  0.23  0.26  0.24  0.30 
P10  61.3  60.1  62.3  56.3 
P90  168.8  181.9  178.1  196.3 
Blue 
Collar 
Gini  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.25 
P10  59.5  60.4  62.1  58.0 
P90  172.7  179.3  178.4  179.7 
White 
Collar 
Gini  0.21  0.27  0.25  0.37 
P10  64.5  62.8  64.9  54.2 
P90  162.5  188.3  180.1  221.6 
Notes  to  Table  9:  1987  Net  earnings;  1993  Gross  earnings;  Socialised  sector  includes  state  and 
cooperative sectors; National sector includes public and private sectors. P10 denotes the earnings of  
the bottom decile relative to  the median, expressed as a percentage. Source: Rutkowski (1996b) 
 
Nunberg (2000) provides some further evidence of public sector pay restructuring in 
civil service in Hungary. This is illustrated by the increases in civil servants‟ salaries in Table 
10.  The  attempt  to  decompress  public  sector  pay  is  shown  by  pay  increases  that  are 
disproportionally concentrated among the top skilled occupations.  
Table 10: Civil Servants with Increased Salaries in Hungary, 1997 
   Percent of staff in class with salaries increased 
Senior Managers  74.2 
Non-Managers with Higher Level Qualifications  47.5 
Civil Servants with Secondary Level Qualifications  36.5 
Administrative Grades  30.1 
Blue Collar Workers  19.3 
Source: Nunberg (2000) 
 
4.3  Public sector wage premia 
The  argument  that  wage  inequality  and  returns  to  education  increased  during 
economic transition should not be too surprising and, whilst compatible with the „story‟ of 
declining monopsonistic power in public sector wage-setting, is also consistent with other 
narratives of the process of transition.  However the next two facets of the transition labour 21 
 
market are less obvious and harder to explain in theoretical settings other than the monopsony 
setting. 
The first argument concerns the public-private sector pay differential.  Most studies of 
this phenomenon across a variety of economic systems find a small positive average pay 
premium for public sector workers in a variety of institutional setting, though differing across 
the wage distribution and by certain important characteristics, such as gender (Disney, 2011).  
This general finding has to be qualified where the public sector employer has a degree of 
market  power  and  can  reduce  the  wage  below  that  of  a  competitive  market.  A  specific 
prediction of the monopsony model in the context of CEE transition economies therefore is 
that the average public sector premium is negative in the early stages of transition when the 
state has greater monopsoney power, with this negative premium disappearing during the 
process of transition. Since major reallocations of employment and rising wages outside the 
public sector during the transition process may provide countervailing tendencies in the „raw‟ 
differential between public and private pay, the effect on the public sector pay penalty or 
premium has to be measured as a conditional effect – controlling for other characteristics 
such as education, age and experience.  Care must also be taken in the fact that public sector 
workers tended to receive payments in kind  (e.g. access to housing or subsidised travel) 
during  the  pre-transition  years,  and  the  gradual  monetisation  of  these  benefits  during 
transition tend to induce an upward bias to the path of measured public sector wages. 
Laušev (2011) examines the trend in public-private sector wage differentials during 
the transition from the Yugoslavian federation to its subsequent states, such as Serbia.  Early 
studies by Kristić and Reilly (2003), Reilly (2003) and Jovanović and Lokshin (2003) for 
these states do indeed suggest substantial negative premia (i.e. penalties) to public sector 
workers in the period before large-scale privatisations, although it is not clear that some of 
these estimates allow for all the non-wage benefits available to public sector workers. Using 
Labour  Force  Survey  data  for  the  period  1995-2003,  2004-08  and  Living  Standards 
Measurement Study data for 2002-03, Laušev shows evidence of negative public sector pay 
differentials in Serbia, conditioned on human capital and other individual characteristics, and 
controlling for non-pay benefits, for much of the late 1990s and the early part of the 2000s 
decade.  This negative differential is eliminated after 2004, and indeed male in 2005 and 
2006 and female public sector workers in 2007 in Serbia earn a premium of around 8% over 
private  sector  workers,  also  conditioned  on  personal  characteristics.  This  transition  from 
penalties to premia for public sector workers is most noticeable among those with primary 22 
 
and high school education, rather than tertitary education. This finding at first sight contrasts 
with our model in which the most educated workers are most affected by monopsony pay-
setting. But it should be borne in mind that employment opportunities in the private sector 
increase  most  sharply  for  highly  educated  workers  in  transition  (as  in  the  previous  sub-
section) and that those the with most ability likely leave the public sector for employment in 
the private sector (or indeed abroad) at the earliest opportunity, so induing a degree of self-
selection. 
Other  studies  confirm  that  public  sector  premia  are  low  or  even  negative  in  pre-
transition economies: see, for example, Adamchik and Bedi (2000) for Poland and Jovanović 
and Lokshin (2004) for Russia.  Both these studies showed that the disparity between higher 
private  sector  wages  and  lower  public  sector  wages  were  especially  large  for  the  highly 
educated, such as graduates, leading to well-known phenomena such as moonlighting and 
absenteeism in the public sector. Jurajda and Terell (2003) investigated the evolution of wage 
levels across sectors in the Czech Republic and also find a private sector wage premium 
during  the  early  transition  period.  However,  this  significant  difference  disappears  during 
transition. They argue that this result is probably caused by a self selection process because 
the first movers from the public to the private sector early in transition are the most able; this 
first mover advantage shrinks over time with the increase of private employment. In similar 
vein, Leping (2006) utilizes quantile regressions for estimation of public-private sector wage 
differentials using Estonian Labor Force Surveys from 1989 to 2004. This study again finds 
negative  public  sector  wage  gaps  during  early  transition  (ranging  from  23%  to  76% 
depending on the percentile) that steadily decrease over time as transition occurs. Analogous 
results  are  reported  by  Hámori  (2007)  and  Laušev  (2011)  for  Hungary  using  employer-
provided  data.  Laušev  (2011)  reports  that  the  public  sector  pay  penalty  correlates  with 
worker‟s position at the earnings distribution (increases from 9% at the bottom to 40% at the 
top percentile in 1996 for male workers) but that workers at all percentiles saw improvements 
in  financial position from  1996 to 2003 when the average gap approached zero. Finally, 
Newell and Socha (1998), using the Labour Force Survey for Poland, estimate an average 
conditional public sector wage gap of 5.2% for men in 1992 and +7.9% in 1996. 
5.4  Employment structure 
A further implication of the monopsonistic interpretation of labour markets in pre-
transition economies is that, other things being equal, the application of monopsonistic power 
to pay implies a greater proportion of skilled workers in employment than would otherwise 23 
 
be  the  case,  assuming  skilled  workers  have  a  lower  supply  elasticity.  Consequently  the 
process of transition and the erosion of monopsonistic power would imply a rise in the ratio 
of unskilled to skilled workers in the public sector, rather than the reverse. 
This  is  harder  to  test,  for  the  simple  reason  that  pre-transition  regimes  were 
characterised by disguised employment, absenteeism and data measurement issues that make 
accurate calibration of employment trends difficult.  Moreover, there are issues as to the 
average quality of „skilled‟ workers produced in pre-transition regimes. Nevertheless there is 
some evidence that the ratios of skilled to unskilled workers in public sector employment 
change in the predicted direction during transition – see, for example, the trends in the ratios 
in Table 2 above for Hungary for actual data.   
One argument which implicitly backs the argument that monopsony power increased 
the  employment  of  skilled  workers  in  pre-transition  economies  is  in  the  recognition  that 
communism provided more opportunities for training skilled workers, although paying them 
less than in a market economy. Table 11 shows that the fraction of more skilled workers – as 
measured by educational attainment – is higher in economies in the early stages of economic 
transition than in developed OECD economies. 
Table 11: Level of education of the labour force as a percent of the total labour force 




Hungary  Poland  Romania  Austria  Greece  Italy  Spain 
  1990  1989  1990  1988  1990  1990  1989  1990  1990 
Basic or 
less  44.6  26  38.4  34.2  35.8  28.6  52.6  26.6  48.4 
Vocational  15.8  21  23.1  29.5  31.4  57.8       
Secondary  30  43.8  26.9  27.9  24  6.3  35.3  66.2  46.1 
Higher  9.6  9.2  11.6  8.4  8.8  7.1  11.4  7.2  5.5 
Notes to Table 11: National statistical yearbooks for Czechoslovakia and Poland; data supplied directly by 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office for Hungary and) for Romania; and ILO data base LABEDUC for OECD 
countries. Source: Boeri and Keese (1992) 
Flanagan  (1998)  details  the  implications  of  this  process  for  the  Czech  Republic, 
showing  that  the  post-1989  transition  saw  a  sharp  increase  in  returns  to  education.  This 
„investment  in  human  capital‟  has  sometimes  been  seen  as  a  beneficial  aspect  of  pre-
transition economies (as in the implict argument of the title of Flanagan‟s paper); however, it 
is only the transition to a market economy that allowed skilled workers to earn a return on 
their contributions comparable to that in market economies.   
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Table 12: Relative employment of skilled to unskilled male full-time employees 
by ownership type in the CEE countries during economic transition 
    Ratio: Skilled to Unskilled employment 
Country  Year  Private sector  Public sector 
Croatia 
1996  0.96  1.38 
2006  0.59  1.17 
Hungary 
1994  0.64  2.56 
2003  0.64  2.35 
Poland 
1994  0.50  0.73 
1999  0.47  0.68 
Serbia 
2004  0.98  2.28 
2008  0.86  2.15 
Notes to Table 12: Skilled: High school degree and higher for Hungary and Poland and 4-years secondary 
school and higher for Croatia and Serbia; Unskilled: Vocational degree and lower for Hungary and Poland and 
3-years secondary school and lower for Croatia and Serbia. Source: Croatian Labor Force Survey from Tomić 
and Domadenik, (2012); Hungarian National Labour Center‟s Wage Survey from Hámori (2007); Labour Force 
Survey of the Republic of Serbia and CHER Polish Household Budget Survey 
   
  Table  12  confirms  an  important  part  of  our  „story‟:  a  greater  proportion  of  skilled 
relative to  unskilled full-time male employees  in  the public  sector relative to  the private 
sector, but also the relative employment of skilled workers in the public sector declines over 
the course of economic transition in all countries. With the exeption of Croatia changes in 
relative employment of skilled workers are more pronounced in public than in the private 
sector.
11   
5.  Discussion of alternative explanations and concluding comments 
This paper considers the role of monopsony in public sector wage-setting. Unlike a 
number of recent papers on this issue which consider a single public sector occupation in 
isolation, it considers the implications for both pay differentials and employment structure of 
a  setting  with  heterogeneous  labour  where  the  public  sector  employer  exerts  differential 
market  power  across  different  types  of  labour.  Empirical  estimates  of  labour  supply 
elasticities suggest that the supply elasticities for skilled workers are lower than those for 
unskilled workers. A formal model is derived in which monopsony power is thereby applied 
primarily to skilled workers and it is shown that the application of this market power results 
in lower skill differentials but a greater employment of skilled to unskilled labour than would 
                                                           
11   An important qualification in using employment figures, however, is that definitions of the „public 
sector‟  differ  across  countries  and  across  data  sets:  for  example  for  Hungary  the  „public  sector‟ 
includes only the centralised budgetary sector; for Serbia, the „public sector‟ includes this sector and 
state and socially-owned enterprises; and for Croatia the data separately identify public and private 
sectors and socially-owned enterprises that are in the process of privatisation. 25 
 
otherwise  be  the  case.  A  calibration  model  based  on  Hungarian  data,  using  actual 
employment  and  wage  rates  and  plausible  estimates  of  supply  elasticities  from  outside 
studies, suggests that the change in Hungarian wage differentials and employment structure 
in  the  public  sector  during  economic  transition  can  be  explained  by  a  weakening  of 
monopsony power. 
Transition in Central and Eastern Europe would seem to be a plausible large scale 
experiment with which to „test‟ the model of the heterogeneous application of monopsony 
power by public enterprises in pre-transition economies, with the clear implication that the 
process of economic transition implies a weakening of the capacity of the state to extract 
surplus from more skilled workers. Specific predictions of the model are that in economic 
transition: skill differentials widen in both public and private sectors, returns to education 
increase, the average public sector „penalty‟ relative to private sector wages disappears, and 
that the growth of unskilled to skilled employment is faster in the public sector than in the 
private sector.  All these predictions are borne out to a greater or lesser extent, given various 
caveats  (for  example,  the  absence  of  official  unemployment  measures  in  communist 
economies) and data limitations. 
In one sense, this interpretation of the process of economic transition in the labour 
market is an obvious one, though it has never (to our knowledge) been spelt out explicitly in 
the context of a formal model.  Nor has the theoretical treatment of the standard monopsony 
model  been  extended  to  consider  the  case  of  skill  heterogeneity  (with  the  possibility  of 
differing supply  elasticities  – at least  in the short  run).  It  is  therefore  worth  considering 
whether our „narratives‟ of pre-transition and transition labour markets are able to capture the 
same essential features of the process. 
The first alternative narrative is implicit in many papers, for example in some of the 
contributions to Commander (1998).  Communist economies are characterised by bargaining 
between workers, the public sector and enterprises in order to generate a „given‟ degree of 
inequality in wage structure. This need not reflect exploitation of differential market power 
by  public  enterprises,  but  merely  the  joint  desire  for  a  more  equal,  or  solidaristic  wage 
distribution. This, of course, also underpins the rationalisation that would be put forward by 
governments and political parties in communist countries, contrasting such polices with the 
inegalitarian policies of western market-oriented countries. However, whilst such a „story‟ is 
certainly consistent with the evidence of lower returns to skilled workers and lower economic 
inequality in pre-transition economies, an egalitarianism which unravels with the transition 26 
 
strategy  of  privatisation  and  the  development  of  a  market-oriented  economy,  it  does  not 
square with some of the other facts adduced here. In particular, an egalitarian story fails to 
explain why the public sector worker is typically paid less than a private sector worker in the 
earliest  stages  of  transition,  and  why  workers  in  the  public  sector  tend  only  to  obtain  a 
premium in the later stages of transition and in market-oriented countries more generally. 
A second alternative „narrative‟ focuses on the „bureaucratic imperative‟ and the role 
of  large-scale  bureaucracies  to  generate  alternative  pays  structures,  typically  involving  a 
series of points and increments related to „performance‟ within the bureaucracy and having 
little relation to spot market equilibria (e.g. performance pay). Furthermore, bureaucracies 
have an incentive to maximise employment within the budget constraint (Niskanen, 1975). 
 This model does indeed provide some insight into wage-setting behaviour in parts of 
the pre-transition CEE bureaucracy (and indeed to some government departments in market 
economies).  In  the  so  called  „non-productive‟  spheres  of  employment  such  as  education, 
health and public administration, remuneration levels in centrally planned CEE economies 
were traditionally based on the average wage in the „productive‟ enterprise sector (Jovanović 
and Lokshin, 2003). The wage setting mechanism in sectors under direct supervision of the 
government (primarily public administration) was founded on a fixed base wage with wage 
scales,  obtained  by  a  multiplication  of  the  base  with  appropriate  coefficients,  varied  by 
educational attainment, seniority, working conditions and level of responsibility (Haltiwanger 
and Vodopivec, 2003). Consequently, centrally determined wage grids with minimum and 
maximum wages (with the latter being a pre-determined multiple of the latter) were used to 
create egalitarian wage distributions (Rutkowski, 1996a). But as a generalized description of 
the phenomena under review, such models generally substitute one form of inequality for 
another  (e.g.  „backloaded‟  wage  profiles  benefiting  older  workers  rather  than  inequality 
derived from „spot‟ market pay determination). They do not explain the particular structure of 
inequality across skill groups, the behaviour of the public sector pay penalty/premium during 
transition, or the implications for the relative employment of different types. 
A  final  alternative  explanation  is  skill-biased  technical  change  (SBTC).  SBTC  is 
likely  to  be  pervasive  across  all  economies,  reflected  in  the  short  run  by  growing  wage 
inequality  between  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  and  in  the  long  run  by  differential 
employment trends.  It is, however, harder to argue that SBTC explains the differential trends 
in wage and employment inequality between CEE transition economies and other developed 
market economies.  If we are prepared to believe that SBTC also involves „skill upgrading‟ 27 
 
amongst existing skilled workers in CEE labour markets, it might also explain the differential 
change in skilled pay between the private and public sectors in those economies.  However 
the  essence  of  the  monopsony  model  is  that  a  pre-transition  economy  overuses  skilled 
workers,  since  the  pay  of  that  group  is  held  down  relative  to  unskilled  workers.  
Consequently,  a  SBTC  explanation  suggests  a  faster  growth  in  employment  of  skilled 
workers  relative  to  unskilled  workers  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case,  whereas  the 
monopsony model predicts a slower growth in that ratio ceteris paribus. Peter (2003) also 
concludes, in the context of transition in Russia, that „institutional factors‟ rather than SBTC 
are the main drivers of wage inequality in that country during transition. 
We conclude, therefore, that insofar as an all-encompassing model can explain the 
varieties  and  vagaries  of  transition  in  CEE  labour  markets,  a  model  of  monopsony  with 
heterogeneous workers is a plausible candidate. Moreover, by doing so, we provide further 
evidence  in  support  of  the  resuscitation  of  the  monopsony  model  of  wage-setting  in  the 
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